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Abstract
This paper constructs a data set on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) adjusted skilled and
unskilled wages in 139 countries for the period 1968-1998, based on the International La-
bor Organization's (ILO) annual October Inquiry and the Freeman and Oostendorp (2000)
Occupational Wages Around the World (OWW) le. It nds strong evidence for the ex-
istence of well-integrated markets for skilled and unskilled labor, justifying the approach
of constructing a skilled wage series and an unskilled wage series. Several signicant re-
sults emerged from an analysis of a representative subset of 67 countries which provided
unbroken coverage for 1970-1994: (i) there is striking evidence of unconditional  con-
vergence in the skilled-unskilled wage ratio worldwide; (ii) this relative wage convergence
was especially strong within a \club" of open economies, suggesting that Heckscher-Ohlin-
Sameulson mechanisms might be at work; and (iii) there is a relatively weak pattern of
 convergence in unskilled real wages, implying that the claim of \Divergence, Big Time"
(Pritchett 1997) has to be qualied when factor markets are studied instead of aggregate
incomes.
I wish to thank Richard Freeman, Michael Murray, Remco Oostendorp, and especially Jerey Williamson
for their helpful comments and suggestions. Freeman and Oostendorp provided generous access to their
OWW data set, while Aart Kraay provided an extended version of the Penn World Tables real GDP per
capita estimates. This work was originally submitted as part of a senior thesis at Harvard University.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the ongoing debate on cross-country convergence from the perspective
of labor markets. It constructs and analyzes a new data set on purchasing-power-parity
(PPP) adjusted wages for skilled and unskilled labor in a large sample of countries from
1968-1998. Up till now, research on growth and convergence has concentrated almost
exclusively on the behavior of aggregate variables such as GDP per capita or per worker;
Baumol (1986), Abramovitz (1986), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Caselli, Esquivel and
Lefort (1996), and others have established many important results on the long run evolution
of aggregate incomes. This paper, however, shares the basic contention of Williamson
(1995) and O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) that factor incomes ought to be studied for the
additional leverage that they give to our understanding of convergence processes, illustrated
so well by studies on Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) eects. There are at least three
good reasons for studying factor incomes.
1
First, economic forces leave their mark on factor markets directly. Convergence or
divergence between countries should therefore be more readily manifested and identiable
in factor price trends than in aggregate income statistics. This is especially true if the
economic forces have an unbalanced or assymetric impact on returns to labor, skills, land,
and capital. Romer (1994), Pritchett (1997), and others have found scant evidence of
convergence in real GDP per capita on a global scale. Will the evidence from labor markets
corroborate this result?
Second, real GDP per capita and per worker are coarse statistics. By averaging out
all factor incomes (or equivalently, all sector value-added production) over the entire pop-
ulation or workforce, these aggregates tend to obscure wage movements that impact the
welfare of individual wage earners. Around the mid-1970s, the United States began to ex-
perience a secular rise in earnings inequality, characterized by a bottoming out of unskilled
wages (Katz and Murphy 1992; Freeman and Katz 1995). In the context of wages, the
skilled-unskilled wage ratio increased dramatically. A cross-country study of this relative
wage ratio can enhance our understanding of how convergence forces in a globalizing world
have inuenced these trends in wage inequality.
Third, movements in factor prices provide valuable clues for sorting out the sources of
1
The following draws on Williamson (1995) and O'Rourke and Williamson (1999).
2
convergence. The dierent hypotheses oered to explain the evolution of country incomes
often make distinct predictions on the returns to skilled and unskilled labor. If broad-based,
non-sector-biased technological change were the main force driving growth, both skilled and
unskilled wages would rise in tandem, and the skilled-unskilled wage ratio should remain
fairly stable. In contrast, if open economy forces were at work, HOS thinking suggests
that production and exports in rich, skilled labor-abundant countries should shift towards
skill-intensive industries, thus raising the relative skilled wage; the exact opposite would be
true for poor, unskilled labor-abundant countries. The skilled-unskilled wage ratio would
move in opposite directions in the two types of economies, generating a convergence in the
relative wage structure across borders. An analysis of factor prices would allow us to take
a rst step towards testing these competing hypotheses.
The above discussion highlights two distinct concepts of convergence { absolute wage
convergence and relative wage convergence.
2
Absolute convergence is closely related to
growth theory and the \convergence hypothesis" { the claim that there exist \powerful and
persistent" (Baumol 1986, p. 1084) catch-up forces that narrow income dierences across
countries. Relative wage convergence is more closely related to trade and HOS theory.
These two concepts are not equivalent: Absolute wages could diverge if technological
progress took place at dierent rates across countries; but relative wages could still converge
if HOS convergence forces were operating in a globalizing world.
This paper aims to ll the gap in the literature on wage convergence over the past 30
years by exploiting a new data set on skilled and unskilled wages. Section 2 briey reviews
the existing work on absolute and relative factor price convergence, as well as two pioneering
studies (Davis 1992; Freeman and Oostendorp 2000) which have attempted wage compar-
isons across a broad sample of countries. Section 3 documents the construction of the data
set. The raw data is from the International Labor Organization's (ILO) annual October
Inquiry, a survey of wages in 159 dierent occupations, which was recently calibrated for
cross-country consistency in Freeman and Oostendorp's (2000) Occupational Wages around
the World (OWW) le.
3
Table 1 lists the 139 economies in the data set and the respective
years of coverage. The geographical scope oered is clearly much larger than for most other
2
Throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, the relative wage refers to the ratio of skilled to
unskilled wages. This skill premium serves as a measure of wage inequality.
3
I am much indebted to Richard Freeman and Remco Oostendorp for allowing the generous use of an
extended version of the OWW for 1968-1998 before it was made available for public use. The manual entry
of raw data from the October Inquiry for the years 1968-1983 was done by myself in November 1999, and
Oostendorp calibrated a preliminary version of the extended OWW in January 2000.
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existing data sets. Section 4 presents several results. Signicantly, we nd unconditional
 convergence in the skilled-unskilled wage ratio. This relative wage convergence was even
more impressive within a subset of 34 countries classied as open by Sachs and Warner
(1995), suggesting that HOS forces may be at work in inuencing relative wages around
the world. We also nd some evidence of absolute  convergence in unskilled real wages, a
fact which the macro literature would never have uncovered. Section 5 concludes.
2 Review
2.1 Absolute Income Convergence
The \convergence hypothesis" has its roots in Gerschenkron's (1952) idea of the \advan-
tages of backwardness", which posited that less developed countries (LDCs) have the po-
tential to adopt the best-practice technologies of industrial leader nations. As this improves
worker productivity in LDCs, real wages should join real GDP per worker in converging on
developed nation levels. Although this convergence should be more readily identiable in
factor price trends, the empirical work has focused overwhelmingly instead on the behavior
of aggregate income variables, partly because of the availability of macro data sets such as
Maddison (1995) and the Penn World Tables. It is now well-known that there has been
little absolute convergence on a global scale in real GDP per capita or per worker (De Long
1988; Romer 1994; Pritchett 1997; Prados 2000; Bourguignon and Morrisson 2000). In fact,
the OECD expanded moderately while parts of the Third World suered negative growth,
leading Pritchett (1997) to conclude that \Divergence, Big Time" has been the \dominant
feature of modern economic history" (p. 3).
Instead, convergence is now viewed as a conditioned phenomenon. Incomes have con-
verged within smaller \clubs" of countries, such as the OECD (Baumol 1986; Abramovitz
1986) or the open economies (Sachs and Warner 1995). In addition, regressions explaining
growth rates as a function of the initial income and a host of conditioning variables (such as
investment, education, openness, and the quality of government) have consistently yielded
a negative coeÆcient on initial income, conrming the presence of conditional convergence
once other country characteristics have been controlled for.
4
The conditioning variables
can be viewed either as determinants of the country-specic steady state income level in
4
Durlauf and Quah (1998) provides an excellent summary of such work. See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995) and La Porta et al. (1999).
4
the Solow (1956) growth model,
5
or as elements of the \social capability" of an economy
to exploit advanced technologies (Abramovitz 1986).
6
In contrast to the extensive literature on aggregate incomes, work on the absolute con-
vergence of wages has been limited. Long run wage convergence is best documented for the
Atlantic Economy (comprising much of the present-day OECD). During the First Global-
ization Boom of 1870-1913, the coeÆcient of variation (CV)
7
of unskilled wages for a sample
of 17 Atlantic economies fell dramatically by a third, due mostly to the shrinking wage gap
between the New and Old Worlds. As transport costs declined and as labor migrated en
masse from the Old World to the labor-scarce New World, both commodity and factor
prices moved towards parity. Signicantly, these trends were reversed during the retreat to
autarky of the Inter-War years (1913-1950), illustrating the pivotal role of globalization in
facilitating convergence (Bordo et al. 1999; O'Rourke and Williamson 1999). Beyond this,
however, the evidence on wage convergence is sparse. We do know that the CV of unskilled
wages in the Atlantic Economy (plus Argentina and Brazil) declined slightly after World
War II (Williamson 1995), and we also have some data on unskilled wages in several Asian,
Latin American, and Mediterranean Basin countries pre-1940 (Williamson 1999). But our
understanding of convergence is incomplete due to the lack of data particularly for LDCs
post-1950. For skilled wages, the evidence is even more piecemeal. Abowd and Boganno
(1995) construct some data on executive and managerial compensation in the OECD, but
we again have very little information from LDCs. Clearly, much work remains to be done
in documenting the post-War global evolution of wages.
2.2 Relative Factor Price Convergence
Relative factor price convergence is a distinct concept from absolute convergence, in that
the former is more closely linked to trade and HOS theory. HOS reasoning suggests that
the skilled-unskilled wage ratio should rise in countries that are better endowed with skilled
labor (relative to unskilled labor), as these countries exploit their comparative advantage in
5
The Solow growth model predicts that aggregate income per capita, Y , converges to a country-specic
steady state level. This extends readily to a prediction of convergence in wages to a steady state level.
Denote skilled and unskilled labor by H and L respectively. If we assume that the marginal products
@Y
@H
and
@Y
@L
are continuous, then these will also converge to some steady state levels.
6
An alternative response to the lack of convergence has been to reject the convergence hypothesis. One
of the motivations for endogenous growth theory has been to construct models that can generate divergence
in the distribution of cross-country incomes (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; Aghion and Howitt 1992).
7
The CV is the standard deviation divided by the mean to control for scale eects.
5
the production and export of skill-intensive goods. The opposite should occur in unskilled
labor-abundant LDCs: The relative wage should decrease as production shifts to make use
of unskilled labor more intensively. Together, this pair of forces generates a convergence in
the relative wage across borders. In fact, if we further assume that countries share identical
homothetic preferences and production technologies, HOS theory predicts a strict outcome
of relative factor prize equalization.
8
While HOS theory has motivated many studies on the impact of globalization on within-
country wage inequality, much of this research has focused on the labor market structures
in individual countries, and few studies have taken on a broader cross-country perspective.
The case that has been studied most is the United States. From 1979-1989, the ratio of
hourly earnings of full-time American workers in the 90th relative to the 10th percentile
of the earnings distribution rose by 20% for males and 25% for females, consistent with
the HOS predictions for skilled-labor abundant countries. Moreover, the erosion of the
wage position was both relative and absolute, as the hourly earnings of young men with
less than 12 years of schooling fell by 20% (Katz and Murphy 1992; Freeman and Katz
1995). The extent to which globalization has been responsible for this widening wage gap
continues to be disputed. Some estimates have attributed as much as 50% of the rise
in inequality in America to trade-induced eects (Wood 1994);
9
others have suggested
more conservative estimates of 10-15% (Freeman 1995) or 15-33% (Feenstra and Hanson
1999), instead placing more credence on a skill-biased technological change explanation as
the main force driving up wage gaps (Lawrence and Slaughter 1993; Berman, Bound and
Griliches 1994; Cline 1997). Moving beyond the United States, there is some evidence on
wage inequality in several other OECD countries from the collection of papers in Freeman
and Katz (1995). In addition, the rise in wage inequality in Latin America in the 1970s has
been contrasted with the fall in wage gaps within Asian LDCs such as Korea, Singapore
and Taiwan (Wood 1997; Wood 1998). Nonetheless, few studies have to date sought to
test explicitly for relative factor price convergence across a broad sample of countries, even
though this is a key prediction which must hold if HOS eects have indeed played a role
in inuencing wages.
8
See Dixit and Norman (1980) for a proof of this result.
9
Wood (1994) estimated that the factor content embodied in net imports caused a 20% rise in the
demand for skilled relative to unskilled labor. Given that the actual increase in demand was about 40%,
this implied that 50% of the rise in wage inequality was caused by trade-related eects (Freeman 1995).
6
2.3 A Brief Survey of Cross-Country Wage Studies
Few comparative wage studies with a truly global scope have been published for the post-
World War II period, primarily because of the lack of data from LDCs. Two studies
stand out as exceptions. Davis (1992) was perhaps the rst to include middle-income
countries (Brazil, Colombia, South Korea, and Venezuela). Between 1960-1990, Davis
documented rising earnings inequality in 7 advanced countries, with the converse trend
of falling inequality in the 4 developing economies, a result consistent with HOS theory.
However, Davis relied on population surveys, most of which were conducted by domestic
statistical agencies with survey procedures diering from country to country, making it
diÆcult to make precise comparisons of the gures across countries. Some country data
sets reported earnings (inclusive of benets and allowances), while others reported baseline
wages. In some countries, Davis had to merge surveys conducted by dierent agencies to
piece together a time trend. The use of micro data is thus only useful in the case of high
or middle income countries with fairly uniform statistical practices.
Instead, this paper uses the occupational wage series from the OWW le (Freeman
and Oostendorp 2000). Freeman and Oostendorp presented some evidence on the large
dispersion (and hence the lack of concergence) in the wages paid for the same occupations
in dierent countries. The authors also constructed a measure of the skill dierential
in each country (a measure of the observed within-country wage dispersion), and found
an inverse U-shape Kuznets-type relationship between the skill dierential amd GDP per
capita. While Freeman and Oostendorp have made a major empirical contribution, the
research potential of the OWW has yet to be exhausted. For a start, the longer panel
from 1968-1998 used in this paper will allow us to tackle questions related to long run
convergence. Also, Freeman and Oostendorp analyzed the OWW from the perspective of
labor economists, thus paying special attention to the dispersion of wages across the full
range of reported occupations. This paper focuses instead on growth and trade issues, and
is thus disposed to thinking in terms of two broad forms of labor inputs, namely skilled and
unskilled, and in terms of stylized wage measures such as the skilled-unskilled wage ratio.
Finally, the wage inequality and skill dierential measures used by Freeman and Oostendorp
are, strictly speaking, not perfectly comparable across countries and time, because the set
of occupations for which wages were actually reported varies substantially from country to
country and from year to year. This paper shall instead use trends in skilled and unskilled
wages from a relatively small, but consistent, subset of occupations from the OWW.
7
3 Deriving the Real Wage Data
3.1 Background
Our primary data source is the ILO's October Inquiry. Each year, the ILO solicits infor-
mation on occupational wages and normal hours of work from country statistical agencies,
and publishes these in a Bulletin of Labor Statistics supplement. Data for the month of
October is requested, helping to control for possible seasonal eects.
10
Two factors make
the Inquiry especially useful for comparative wage studies. First, the range of occupations
and countries is very extensive. From 1953-1983, 48 occupations were surveyed; this was
expanded in 1983 to a total of 159 occupations, drawn from the full spectrum of agriculture,
manufacturing, and service industries. Up to 1998, an impressive total of 182 countries and
territories had been represented in at least one issue of the Inquiry (Table 1, Freeman and
Oostendorp 2000). Second, each occupation is clearly dened by a specic set of job tasks,
as enacted in the ILO's International Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO, 1968).
This should in principle ensure that the country agencies submit wage returns for identical
work, bringing us close to the ideal of consistent reportage across all countries.
However, the October Inquiry in its original form has one signicant shortcoming: Dif-
ferent countries report wage levels using dierent earnings concepts, making it hard to
make careful cross-country comparisons. For example, in 1995, the United States reported
median weekly earnings; Germany listed collectively bargained wage rates; while India
reported minimum wage rates (Freeman and Oostendorp 2000). In practice, \wage rates"
refer to returns per unit time of labor eort, while \earnings" typically include additional
compensation such as allowances or bonuses. While most of the gures were for both men
and women, some countries reported wages for only one gender.
11
Freeman and Oostendorp
(2000) dealt with this inconsistency problem by calibrating the raw Inquiry data economet-
rically in the OWW le, re-expressing all the gures into one standardized pay measure,
10
The choice of October over other months appears to be purely accidental. A complete list of reporting
agencies is in the appendices of the Inquiry for each post-1983 year.
11
A quick note on alternative sources of wage data is in order. One alternative is the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) les, which report remuneration in manufacturing for a
sample of countries similar to the Inquiry. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has also published a data release
on \hourly compensation costs for production workers in manufacturing" for newly industrializing and
developed countries, available at http://stats.bls.gov/flsdata.htm. These two data sets are used in
Rodrik (1999). Unfortunately, both of these alternatives focus only on relatively unskilled labor. The
UNIDO les are also plagued by inconsistencies, since the pay concepts reported there also range between
wages and earnings.
8
the average hourly wage rate of male workers. The authors worked with a specication
in which the log wage is a function of a matrix of pay measure, gender, occupation, and
time dummies, plus country by year interaction terms, from which the average male hourly
wage rate could be predicted. This was estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) to
allow for a more complex error structure, as there are potentially dierent sources of error
arising from variation in the dierent sets of dummy variables.
12
3.2 Choice of Occupations
We chose 7 occupations each for skilled and unskilled labor from the OWW as the basis
for constructing our real wage series. The approach of studying market wage trends by
bringing together data from various industries has a long precedent in the labor literature
(Slichter 1950). The 7 unskilled occupations selected were: thread and yarn spinners
in the textiles industry (#25); sewing machine operators in the manufacture of wearing
apparel excluding footwear (#30); laborers in printing, publishing and allied industries
(#51); laborers in the manufacture of industrial chemicals and other chemical products
(#56/#59)
13
; laborers in the manufacture of machinery except electrical (#70); laborers
in electric light and power (#80); and laborers in construction (#90).
14
These choices
satised three criteria. First, the job scopes did not require more than primary education.
Second, the industries picked were found in most economies, ensuring wide geographical
coverage. Third, to examine the impact of openness on wages, several of these jobs were in
industries that manufacture potentially tradable goods, such as textiles and apparel. These
7 occupations lie on the low end of the wage spectrum in the OWW: In countries that
listed wages for at least 80 of the 159 occupations during 1983-1998, the 7 occupations were
in the lower one-third of the distribution of reported wages in at least 75% of country-year
pairs, with one exception (#80).
15
12
Specically, Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) estimated the following: W
i;j;o;t
= D
i;j;o;t
A
i;j;o;t
+
i;j;o;t
,
where i denotes the pay concept, j denotes gender, o denotes occupation, t denotes time, and 
i;j;o;t
is a
random error term. W
i;j;o;t
denotes the log wage, D
i;j;o;t
is a matrix of pay measure, gender, occupation,
time dummies, and country by year interaction terms, and A
i;j;o;t
is a vector of coeÆcients.
13
Prior to 1983, the Inquiry reported only one wage gure for laborers in the chemical industry. This was
broken into two occupations in 1983, for the manufacture of industrial chemicals (#56) and the manufacture
of other chemical products (#59). The OWW links the series before 1983 with an unweighted average of
#56 and #59.
14
Parentheses contain the code number assigned to each occupation in the October Inquiry.
15
Occupation #80 was in the lower one-third of the wage spectrum in 58% of country-year pairs. When
countries do not report wages for all 159 occupations, it may be diÆcult to assess the relative position of
the occupations on the full skill hierarchy, as the sample reported might have given more coverage to say
the unskilled occupations. We try to minimize this eect by restricting the statistic to countries which
9
For skilled labor, the 7 occupations were: chemical engineers in the manufacture of
industrial chemicals (#52); power distribution and transmission engineers (#76); bank
accountants (#129); computer programmers in the insurance industry (#133); govern-
ment executive oÆcials in public administration (#139); mathematics teachers at the third
(tertiary) level (#145); and general physicians (#152). The skilled workers we focus on are
professionals, as opposed to artisans or craftsmen, who have been more closely documented
in the economic history literature.
16
The \skilled" wages are thus a wage return to tech-
nical expertise that would require at least a secondary level of schooling. Certainly, these
7 occupations lie above the 75th percentile of the wage distribution for country-year pairs
reporting at least 80 occupations during 1983-1998. Unfortunately, skilled occupations like
these 7 were only introduced into the October Inquiry in 1983; we circumvent this lack of
coverage in Section 3.4 by using proxies.
For the 14 occupations, nominal wages were deated by a PPP index for consumption
goods, and re-based in 1990 US dollars, the numeraire for this paper. A PPP index for
consumption goods is used, since this most closely reects the actual purchasing power over
goods that workers themselves buy.
17
Table 2a reports some summary statistics: the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles for the
unskilled occupations, pooled over time. The distribution of wages in these 7 jobs were
very similar, with only slight dierences in the degree of right skew. The same observations
apply also to the 7 skilled occupations (Table 2b). The average pair-wise correlation is 0.96
for the 7 unskilled jobs, and 0.93 for the 7 skilled jobs. Clearly, trends among the unskilled
(respectively skilled) occupations are very similar, implying that there are well-integrated
factor markets for unskilled and skilled labor. This justies the approach of modeling the
two forms of labor as separate factors of production with their distinct wage trends.
reported wages for at least 80 of the 159 occupations. We keep #80 because of the uniformity in job
description for unskilled laborers in the ISCO (1968).
16
The choice of #139 is defensible as government executives should earn a wage commensurate with
market rates in the private sector to cover the opportunity cost of working in the public sector. Table 2b
conrms that the distribution of wages for #139 was similar to that of the other skilled occupations.
17
The PPP index reports the amount of local currency equivalent in purchasing power over consumption
goods to one 1990 US$. PPP gures up to 1992 were from the Penn World Tables. These were extended
to 1998 using the formula PPP
t+1
= PPP
t

CPI
t+1
CPI
t
, where PPP
t
and CPI
t
denote respectively the PPP
index and the consumer price index in year t. CPI data was from the \Global Development Network Growth
Database" (Easterly and Yu 1999). Where necessary, this was augmented using the IMF's International
Financial Statistics Yearbook (IFS). These two sources are almost completely identical for overlap years.
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3.3 An Econometric Framework
We now outline the econometric framework for constructing the unskilled wage series.
(The entire exposition carries over to the skilled wage series as well.) Let w
U
c;t
denote the
underlying wage series for the base-line market returns to unskilled labor, free of occupation-
specic eects. Here, c denotes country, and t denotes year. Let w
i
c;t
denote the observed
real wages in the 7 unskilled occupations, where i ranges from 1 to 7. We posit that each
observed real wage series is a linear function of the underlying wage trend w
U
c;t
:
w
i
c;t
= 
i
1
+ 
i
2
w
U
c;t
+ "
i
c;t
(1)
Notice that 
i
1
and 
i
2
are specic to each occupation, while "
i
c;t
 N(0; 
2
"
i
) is indepen-
dent normally distributed random error. The system in (1) is seriously under-identied,
with twice as many coeÆcients as there are equations. While we would like to estimate
w
U
c;t
directly with E(w
U
c;t
) =  

i
1

i
2
+
1

i
2
w
i
c;t
, this is not possible given that estimates of all the
's cannot be obtained. Instead, we run pair-wise regressions of one occupation against
another, to tease out the trends in occupation i that can be predicted by movements in
occupation j 6= i. In this way, we capture the commonalities in wage trends that are the
underlying factor price trends in the unskilled labor market.
18
In particular, we solve (1)
simultaneously for occupations i and j to eliminate w
U
c;t
:
w
i
c;t
=
 

i
1
 

i
2

j
1

j
2
!
+

i
2

j
2
w
j
c;t
+
 
"
i
c;t
 

i
2

j
2
"
j
c;t
!
; 1  i; j  n (2)
It is crucial that the correlation between w
i
c;t
and w
j
c;t
should derive from the common
wage trend, w
U
c;t
, rather than from any correlation between the error terms, "
i
c;t
and "
j
c;t
.
If Cov("
i
c;t
; "
j
c;t
) 6= 0, the apparent correlation between w
i
c;t
and w
j
c;t
would potentially be
spurious, invalidating the claim that there exists a common wage trend. The most likely
sources of correlation between the error terms are country eects, such as localized economic
events or biases in the reporting practices of domestic statistical agencies. To control for
these, a random eects specication was considered, in which the error term in (2) was
re-written as:

"
i
c;t
 

i
2

j
2
"
j
c;t

= 
i
c
+ 
i
c;t
, where 
i
c
 N(0; 
2

) is a country-specic error
term, and 
i
c;t
 N(0; 
2

) is pure random error. However, when the Hausman test was
performed, it overwhelmingly favored a xed eects model: The coeÆcient of w
j
c;t
from
xed eects estimation was signicantly dierent at the 5% level from that obtained from
random eects estimation (feasible GLS) in 37 of the 76 = 42 pair-wise regressions among
18
I am greatly indebted to Michael Murray for this suggestion.
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unskilled occupations. The same was found for 39 of the 42 skilled wage regressions. We
thus re-write (2) with country xed eects:
w
i
c;t
= D
c

i;j
c
+

i
2

j
2
w
j
c;t
+
 
"
i
c;t
 

i
2

j
2
"
j
c;t
!
(3)
Here, D
c
is a matrix of country dummies which replaces the constant term in (2), and 
i;j
c
is a vector of xed eects coeÆcients.
19
The regression results for (3), run using the interpolated occupational wage series, are
reported in Tables 3a and 3b. All R
2
values, with the odd exception, are high, averaging
0.86 and 0.55 respectively for the unskilled and skilled occupations.
20
Most of the variance
of w
i
c;t
in (3) is thus accounted for by the dependent wage series, w
j
c;t
, and by the country
dummies; the "
i
c;t
and "
j
c;t
terms are small, insofar as they do not signicantly obscure the
common trends that underlie the occupational wage series. This once again conrms that
markets are well-integrated for both skilled and unskilled labor.
Using D
c

i;j
c
+

i
2

j
2
w
j
c;t
as a linear predictor, we obtain 7 series that capture trends in
w
i
c;t
{ the original series and 6 series predicted from regressions. For countries which
did not report w
i
c;t
but did report w
j
c;t
, we are unable to compute this linear predictor
since the country coeÆcients could not be estimated. In such cases, out-of-sample country
eects were estimated from a regression of the country coeÆcients in 
i;j
c
against the mean
predicted value of

i
2

j
2
w
j
c;t
. This uses the fact that in a xed eects model, the country
coeÆcients are correlated with the mean predicted wage net of the xed eects. This
procedure may be ad hoc, but any errors introduced are small, as indicated by the average
standard error of the predictors (SEP) for the out-of-sample eects (reported as the rst
\SEP" gure in the cells in Tables 3a and 3b.) In Table 3a, the average of these 42 SEP
gures was 0.10, barely 3.9% of the average standard deviation of US$2.66 for wages in the
7 unskilled occupations. Similarly in Table 3b, this average SEP gure was 0.78, or 10.4%
of the average standard deviation of US$7.49 for wages in the 7 skilled occupations.
For each i, the 6 series predicted from (3) were highly correlated with the original w
i
c;t
,
with the correlation coeÆcient always larger than 0.95 for unskilled wages and 0.94 for
skilled wages. We took a simple unweighted average of these 7 unbiased estimators of w
i
c;t
19
The possibility of time eects was considered, namely that common economic shocks across countries
might induce systematic shifts in wage levels in a given year. However, time dummies were rarely signicant
in xed eects regressions, and did not add much to the R
2
's. The time dummies were therefore dropped.
20
The R
2
's for the skilled job regressions was smaller due to the presence of more outliers.
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to obtain a series w^
i
c;t
that incorporates unskilled wage trends from all 7 occupations. The
average pair-wise correlation for the 7 w^
i
c;t
's was 0.95 for unskilled occupations and 0.78
for skilled occupations, indicative of the common factor price trend in each labor market.
To back out a single unskilled wage series, one would ideally take a weighted average of
the w^
i
c;t
's, using the employment shares of each occupation i as weights. As such gures
were not readily available, we settled for a simple unweighted average instead. While this
unweighted average may be shifted from the true level of w
U
c;t
by a constant, it nonetheless
captures the salient wage movements which are the focus of our attention.
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One last econometric complication remains to be addressed. In (3), the covariate w
j
c;t
is measured imprecisely and this introduces issues pertaining to measurement error. Since
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V ar("
j
c;t
) 6= 0, the assumption of least squares mod-
els requiring independence between the error terms and the covariates is violated. The
estimated coeÆcient of w
j
c;t
is thus asymptotically inconsistent, with an attenuation bias
towards zero.
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For our regressions, however, this bias is not serious. The standard error of
the linear predictors, D
c

i;j
c
+

i
2

j
2
w
j
c;t
, are all tolerably small (reported as the second \SEP"
gure in each cell in Tables 3a and 3b.) The average SEP was 0.19 in Table 3a and 1.04 in
Table 3b, respectively 7.1% and 13.9% of the average standard deviation of wages in the
7 unskilled and skilled occupations. The imprecision introduced by the residual errors is
thus relatively small, though slightly larger for the skilled regressions. Moreover, all the
slope coeÆcients in Tables 3a and 3b are statistically signicant at the 5% level, with only
2 exceptions.
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3.4 Proxying for the Full Skilled Wage Series
The work in section 3.3 has produced an unskilled wage series for 1968-1998, and a skilled
wage series for 1983-1998. To extend the skilled wage series back to 1968, 10 \fairly
skilled" occupations for which coverage in the October Inquiry spanned all 30 years were
used as proxies. Table 2c lists these occupations, along with summary statistics. By
comparing the median with that from Tables 2a and 2b, one can see that these 10 jobs lie
21
Our constructed unskilled wage series is consistent with the O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) Atlantic
economy data base. For overlapping data points, the correlation between the two series is 0.61.
22
See Greene (1997, p. 439-440) for a discussion of this problem.
23
The exceptions are the pairs #52 & #129, and #52 & #152. Measurement error should be more
serious for the skilled wage series because of the larger number of outliers. However, the attenuation bias
should reduce the point estimates for the skilled wages by more than for the unskilled wages, which would
lead the skilled-unskilled wage ratio to under-state wage inequality.
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between the skilled and unskilled occupations in the wage hierarchy. These fairly skilled
occupations require some literary or technical prociency, though they fall short of being
fully professional jobs. Within the predominantly unskilled set of occupations surveyed
pre-1983, for countries reporting at least 24 of the 48 wages requested, the fairly skilled
occupations were higher than the median wage in at least 60% of the country-year cells,
with two exceptions (#91 and #92).
24
The estimation proceeds much as before, with the skilled wage series for 1983-1998
now regressed on the fairly skilled occupations one at a time, together with country xed
eects.
25
Out-of-sample country eects are estimated using the same procedure in Section
3.3. Summary results are presented in Table 3c. Importantly, the R
2
's obtained are all
high, ranging from 0.59 to 0.79; our proxies therefore account for a large share of the
variance in skilled wages, larger perhaps than one might initially have expected given that
there are non-trivial discrepancies in skill intensities between the two sets of occupations.
Furthermore, the slope coeÆcients are all signicant at the 1% level. Once more, the
imprecision due to possible measurement error is reasonably small: The average of the
10 SEPs for the linear wage predictor is 0.49, or 14.8% of the average standard deviation
of US$3.33 for the reported wages in the 10 proxy occupations. (The average of the 10
SEPs for the out-of-sample coeÆcient predictors is an even smaller 0.45.) The coeÆcients
estimated from the 1983-1998 data are then used to obtain 10 predicted skilled wage series
for the full period. This necessarily assumes that the relationship between the fairly skilled
and skilled occupations was stable throughout 1968-1998. Finally, we take a precision-
weighted average of the 10 predicted series to obtain the full skilled wage series; here, the
precision is the reciprocal of the variance of each linear predictor.
26
Reassuringly, there is a tight t between the proxied wage series and the skilled wage
series constructed in Section 3.3 for the 821 data points from the overlap years 1983-1998.
The correlation between the two series is 0.99. The mean square error between these two
series is a relatively small US$0.70, a gure that is inated primarily because of a handful
of outliers. The median square error is an even smaller US$0.06. The rest of this paper
uses the fully proxied skilled wage series for 1968-1998.
24
#91 and #92 were above the median in 56% and 34% of the country-year cells respectively.
25
The Hausman test comes up signicant even at the 1% level for 3 of these proxies. For consistency, a
xed eects model as in (3) is used for all 10 regressions.
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Given independent unbiased estimators
^

i
for a quantity, the minimum variance unbiased estimated
that is also a linear combination of the
^

i
's is the precision-weighted average. This result follows from
solving a standard constrained maximazation problem via a Lagrangian.
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4 Analysis of Wage Trends (1970-1994)
We now analyze the real wage series constructed in Section 3, focusing on the sample of
67 countries asterisked in Table 1. This is the largest subset of the 139 countries for which
unbroken wage series for both skilled and unskilled labor could be derived for 1970-1994
with a minimal amount of extrapolation.
27
Here, we are trading o consistency for scope,
since wage levels in this subset can be more easily compared over time without having to
worry about countries entering or dropping out of the sample. Nonetheless, we do not
lose much in terms of the generality of the results. The smaller panel includes countries
from all major geographical regions and levels of economic development, while the analysis
repeated for the full sample of 139 economies yields almost identical results.
28
4.1 The Worldwide Distribution of Real Wages
We start with an overview of the salient features of the distribution of real wages. Most
signicantly, there is a large amount of dispersion in wage levels across countries. In 1994,
the highest skilled wage in the sample (Trinidad and Tobago) was 21 times the lowest
(Sudan). The disparity was even greater for unskilled labor: The highest-paid unskilled
workers (Sweden) earned 27 times more than the lowest (Zambia). We are clearly far from
a world of strict equalization of factor prices. Figure 1 illustrates this point with kernel
density plots of the distributions of skilled and unskilled wages in 1994.
29
Notice that
both diagrams are right-skewed; as recently as the 1990s, workers in high-income countries
continued to earn signicantly more than their counterparts in LDCs. For skilled wages,
the plot has a wide-based unimodal shape (Figure 1a). Kernel density plots from earlier
years are essentially similar, indicating that there have been few dynamic changes in the
shape of the skilled wage distribution since 1970.
More interestingly, for unskilled wages, there is some evidence for the emergence of a
\twin-peaked" distribution, along the lines of Quah's (1996; 1997) hypothesis for the global
distribution of real GDP per capita. Kernel density plots from earlier years such as 1970
and 1982 show a much less distinct bimodal shape, resembling more a unimodal shape with
a long and uneven right tail. This evidence on \twin peaks" is suggestive of the emergence
27
This involved geometrically extrapolating the data forward and backward in time by 3 to 4 years. A
few countries for which the extrapolations suggested unreliably large growth rates were dropped.
28
This parallel analysis is available upon request.
29
The kdensity command in STATA was used to produce these plots.
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of two convergence clubs, with economies within each club becoming increasingly similar,
possibly because of increased interaction through trade or technological transfers. In Figure
1b, we observe one distinct peak centered near the US$2 hourly wage mark, comprising
mainly Third World economies; a smaller peak around the US$6.50 level, consisting mostly
of fast-growing LDCs; and a long right-tail made up of the OECD countries.
We briey examine the evolution of average wage levels by geographical regions over
the entire 25 year period.
30
Among less economically developed regions, wage growth was
strongest in the Pacic Basin and in North Africa and the Middle East. Between 1970-
1994, unskilled hourly wages rose from US$3.00 to US$4.22 in the Pacic Basin, and from
US$1.72 to US$3.26 in North Africa and the Middle East. Conversely, unskilled wages
in North America and the Caribbean fell from US$17.42 to US$16.00, contributing to an
impressive convergence across the Pacic Ocean. Unskilled wages in the United States alone
eroded more than 50% between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s.
31
Elsewhere, however,
there was little change in the wage hierarchy from 1970-1994. The high wages in Western
Europe continued to increase, registering per annum growth of 0.28% for skilled wages
and 1.26% for unskilled wages.
32
In contrast, skilled and unskilled wages in South and
Central America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa recorded little or negative growth,
and remained stuck at the bottom of the pecking order.
There are three points worth highlighting on the relative skilled-unskilled wage. First,
wage inequality increased dramatically in several Third World regions. In South and Cen-
tral America, this wage ratio surged from 3.1 in 1970 to a high of 4.3 in 1985 following the
Latin debt crisis. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the relative wage actually fell initially, but this
trend reversed in the late 1970s when aggregate incomes also began to collapse in many
African countries (Pritchett 1997), leaving it as the region with the highest level of wage
inequality by 1994. Second, relative wages converged between the Pacic Basin and North
America. The skilled-unskilled wage ratio fell more than 40% in the Pacic Basin between
1970-1994, from 5.1 to 3.0, to draw even with North American levels. Third, wage inequal-
ity in Western Europe was among the lowest in the world, and even declined slightly. In
30
More details on wage trends and growth rates by geographical regions for both skilled and unskilled
wages are available upon request. The classication of countries by regions follows Table 1.
31
This 50% drop is admittedly much larger than corresponding gures in the labor literature, which
place the decline in American unskilled wages in the order of 20% (Freeman and Katz 1995). However,
the wage series in this paper captures only baseline wage rates, and omits overtime pay and other earnings
that are usually recorded in the micro labor surveys.
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The average annual growth rate was computed using the standard formula:
1
T
(ln(w
T
)  ln(w
0
)), where
T is the time elapsed in years, and w
T
and w
0
are the nal and initial wage levels respectively.
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contrast, the relative wage ratio rose from 2.5 to 3.0 in the United States, a 20% rise in
wage inequality consistent with ndings in the labor literature. The American experience
of rising inequality was thus not shared by all OECD countries, as previously noted by
Katz, Love and Blanchower (1995).
4.2  Convergence
We formally assess the strength of convergence forces in the spirit of William Baumol's
(1986) article. Recall that unconditional  convergence exists when the growth rate of per
capita income is negatively related to the initial income level; in other words, countries
that start with lower per capita incomes tend to grow faster and catch up with richer
countries. We therefore run regressions of the average growth rate in the wage (or income)
variables between 1970-1994 against the initial 1970 wage (or income) level.
First, we perform this exercise for real GDP per worker to establish a benchmark for
comparison.
33
Table 4, Column (1) shows that there is no evidence of  convergence in this
aggregate income variable. In fact, the point estimate of the coeÆcient on initial income
(the  coeÆcient) is positive though statistically insignicant, suggesting weak divergence.
This reproduces the well-known result of Romer (1994). When we repeat this analysis for
the skilled wage series, the positive  coeÆcient in Table 4, Column (2) is even signicant at
the 10% level. A convergence story only begins to emerge when we examine unskilled labor.
The slope in Figure 2a is now negative, although this  coeÆcient is still not statistically
signicant even at the 10% level (Table 4, Column (3)). The evidence for unconditional
 convergence in unskilled wages is thus weak and tentative. One should note that the
OECD countries, with initial wages lying above US$4, are most responsible for tilting the
slope of the regression line towards a negative gradient, suggesting that these economies
form a distinct convergence club (Baumol 1986).
The most striking result pertains to the relative wage ratio. In Figure 2b, the data
points cluster to indicate a distinct negative association between initial levels and subse-
quent growth rates. The  coeÆcient is signicantly negative even at the 1% level (Table
4, Column (4a)). When two outliers, Burundi (BDI) and Nigeria (NGA), are deleted, the 
33
Real GDP per capita in constant international dollars were from the Penn World Tables, extended past
1992 by Aart Kraay in a data set procured through personal communication. To convert the data into per
worker form, the United Nations ve-yearly demographic estimates were used. We take the workforce to be
the population between ages 15 and 64. Missing years in the UN data base were geometrically interpolated.
The income gures were re-expressed in 1990 US$.
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coeÆcient almost doubles, indicating an even faster rate of convergence (Table 4, Column
(4b)). We thus have strong evidence of relative wage convergence within this wide sample
of 67 countries. Note that this nding does not contradict the fact that there was little
absolute convergence in skilled wages and at most weak convergence in unskilled wages.
Absolute wage levels can diverge even while relative wages converge if technological progress
is Hicks-neutral, so long as the rates of technological progress dier across countries. Intu-
itively, skilled and unskilled wages would rise in tandem within countries, but at dierent
speeds across countries, making it possible for the relative wage to converge.
We can quantify the rate of convergence by calculating a convenient \convergence half-
life" { the length of time that needs to elapse for a given income gap to be reduced
by 50%. We take this initial income gap to be the 5th-95th percentile gap in the 1994
distribution of the relevant wage (or income) variable. The last row of Table 4 calculates
this \convergence half-life" for all regressions in which the  coeÆcient is negative.
34
For
our best specication in column (4b), this half-life was approximately 33 years, in the same
order of magnitude as the half-life that growth economists have obtained for empirical tests
of the Solow growth model that report convergence rates of 2-3%.
35
The unconditional  convergence in the skilled-unskilled wage ratio is a fairly surpris-
ing result, especially in the light of the empirical work of Daniel Treer (1995). Treer
calibrated a generalized version of the HOS model { the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model
{ that admits for an arbitrary number of countries and factors of production, and found
that the observed factor-content of trade was signicantly lower than that predicted by
the Vanek equations, generating the \mystery of the missing trade". Our nding of un-
conditional  convergence is thus important: It suggests that while one does not observe
relative factor price equalization, the insights of HOS theory nonetheless remain relevant
for explaining this underlying tendency towards relative convergence. Remarkably, this
convergence applies to a broad sample that includes economies with varying degrees of
openness to international trade. On the other hand, the lack of relative factor price equal-
34
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For example, Mankiw et al. (1992), and Caselli et al. (1996). Note that the half-life in the Solow-type
regressions is the number of years required to halve the gap between the current income level and the
steady state level. This half-life is not directly comparable with t
1
2
, even though the orders of magnitude
are suggestive of a similar rate of convergence.
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ization can be attributed to the fact that the assumptions needed to generate this result,
such as identical technologies and identical, homothetic preferences, are unlikely to hold in
the real world.
4.3 A Convergence Club of Open Economies
HOS theory suggests that the trend towards relative wage convergence should be even
stronger for countries that are open to international economic forces. Do we have evidence
then that the open economies form a convergence \club"? Sachs and Warner (1995) pro-
vides a convenient \openness" variable for classifying economies. This criterion deems a
country to be closed if it had one or more of the following characteristics during 1980-89:
non-tari barriers covering 40% or more of trade; average tari rates of 40% or more; a
black market exchange rate depreciated by 20% or more relative to the oÆcial exchange rate
during the 1970s or 1980s (indicating an over-valued, tightly controlled oÆcial exchange
rate); a socialist economic system; or a state monopoly on any major exports.
Admittedly, there are several criticisms of the Sachs-Warner criterion. The cut-os of
40% and 20% are purely normative gauges of levels of protection that might be considered
prohibitive. Also, there are strange anomalies. India during the 1990s is considered open
in spite of an industrial sector notoriously resistant to foreign participation. China, on the
other hand, is classied as closed, despite its booming trade volumes. We nonetheless use
the Sachs-Warner criterion for two reasons. First, as a matter of practicality, the available
alternatives all come with their own problems. The ratio of exports or imports to GDP
is indicative of openness, but trade volumes are endogenous to growth rates, making it
diÆcult to deduce a causal relationship between openness and growth. Moreover, these
ratios are small (less than 15%) for OECD economies such as the United States which
we would consider to be open. Other common measures of openness, such as tari and
non-tari barriers, have already been incorporated in the Sachs-Warner variable. Second,
we can specically test the assertion of Sachs and Warner (1995) that the economies they
classify as open constitute a convergence club. In all, 34 countries were classied as open,
while 28 were considered closed; 5 economies could not be classied because of inconclusive
primary source evidence on trade regimes.
36
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The 34 open economies are: Mauritius, Ghana, Tunisia, Cyprus, Jordan, Bolivia, Guyana, Venezuela,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and all the
OECD countries. The fact that this includes many LDCs implies that \openness" is not simply a proxy
variable for high income countries. The 5 unclassied are: Seychelles, Suriname, Puerto Rico, St Lucia,
19
Figure 3 and Table 5 report the results on  convergence for the 34 open economies. As
in Section 4.2, the evidence is unimpressive for real GDP per worker and skilled wages: The
 coeÆcients in Table 5, Columns (1) and (2) are insignicant even at the 10% level, while
the point estimate for skilled wages continues to suggest divergence. However, convergence
was impressive for the remaining two wage variables, even more so than for the larger
sample of 67. In Figure 3a, the negative relationship between the growth rate of unskilled
wages and the initial level is now statistically signicant even at the 1% level, with a
computed half-life of 29 years (Table 5, Column (3)). The linear t is even tighter in
Figure 3b, which had the highest adjusted R
2
among all the regressions of 0.33 (Table 5,
Column (4)). In short, these 34 open economies exhibited an even stronger trend towards
unconditional  convergence for both unskilled wages and relative wages, suggesting a link
between globalization and convergence. Sachs and Warner were right about the existence
of a convergence club of open economies.
The evidence on relative convergence is strengthened if we consider a breakdown of the
open economies into the OECD and non-OECD countries. In the non-OECD economies,
the average skilled-unskilled wage ratio fell almost 25%, from a high of 5.0 in 1985 to
3.8 in 1994, towards the lower levels in the OECD countries (which hovered around the
2.4 mark during this period). This is again very appealing from the perspective of HOS
theory, pointing to the convergence of relative wages between developed and developing
countries within the larger set of open economies. It also suggests that most of the relative
convergence was driven by the declining skilled-unskilled wage in the non-OECD open
economies, rather than by a rising wage ratio in the OECD. Once again, the rise in wage
inequality in the United States seems to have been the exception rather than the rule
for the OECD. Unfortunately, HOS theory does not provide a ready explanation for this
assymetry in the movement towards relative factor price convergence.
What about the direct links between openness and growth rates? Sachs and Warner
argued that open economies had unambiguously higher rates of income per capita growth
since 1965 than closed economies (Figure 2, Sachs and Warner 1995). Using geographic
variables as instruments for the trade volume of a country, Frankel and Romer (1996)
also showed that trade has a large positive eect on growth rates. To shed some light
on this issue, Table 6 computes income and wage growth rates to allow us to make some
comparisons. Looking at the far-right column, the 28 closed economies generally performed
and Iceland. The remaining 28 countries are classied as closed. Please see the appendix to Sachs and
Warner (1995) for more details.
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badly: Both skilled and unskilled wages recorded negative average annual growth rates
(-0.71% and -0.86% respectively), while wage inequality rose by a non-trivial +0.93%. In
contrast, the rst column shows that both wage and real GDP per worker growth rates
were unambiguously higher, while increases in wage inequality were unambiguously smaller,
among the open economies than in the closed ones. There were also important dierences in
the growth dynamics within the set of open economies. For the non-OECD open economies,
average growth rates for both skilled and unskilled wages drew level with the OECD during
1983-1994: For example, skilled wage growth saw a major improvement from -0.43% for
1970-1982 to +0.08% in the later period, virtually equal to the +0.09% experienced in the
OECD. One should note that 10 of the 18 non-OECD open economies achieved full trade
liberalization only in the mid-to-late 1980s { Ghana in 1985, Costa Rica in 1986, and the
Philippines in 1988 to cite a few examples (Sachs and Warner 1995).
37
That the opening of
trade regimes coincided with the catch-up of wage growth rates provides further evidence
that trade has been benign to workers in these developing economies. Admittedly, this
relationship may not be a causal one; open economic policies and healthy wage growth
may both have been driven by some unidentied third factor, such as prudent government.
Nonetheless, the strong correlation between the two merits further investigation.
4.4  Convergence
The  convergence measure is a long run phenomena, requiring about 30 years to shrink
the 5th-95th percentile gap in 1994 by half. A more immediate measure is  convergence,
dened simply as a decline in the actual dispersion of wages (or incomes). It is important to
note that these two convergence concepts are not equivalent.  convergence is a necessary
but insuÆcient condition for  convergence, since year-to-year uctuations or shocks can
increase the short-term cross-sectional dispersion of wages.
38
The evidence on  convergence is generally less dramatic than that for  convergence.
Signicantly, the CV of unskilled wages in the panel of 67 countries did decrease slowly but
steadily from 0.89 to 0.83. This  convergence is not particularly impressive by historical
standards: Recall that during 1870-1913, the CV of unskilled wages fell by one-third within
37
These countries were classied as open although they were fully liberalized for only part of 1970-1994.
One should note that this generous denition of an open economy biases us against detecting convergence:
With a wider sample of \open" economies, we risk adding countries to a potential convergence club that
might not belong there in the rst place.
38
See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for a proof.
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the Atlantic Economy, driven mostly by the migration of up to 60 million people across the
Atlantic Ocean (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999). The last 30 years have not seen labor
mobility anywhere close to these levels, which may partially explain why  convergence
has been weaker post-World War II. This muted  convergence conrms similar results
reported in Williamson (1995) for the Atlantic Economy plus a handful of Latin American
countries. In contrast, the CV of skilled wages increased through 1970-1994 from 0.56 to
0.63. Last, but not least, the CV for the relative wage uctuated a lot more, rising from
0.65 in 1970, to a high of 0.73 in 1986, dipping to a low of 0.60 in 1991, and then leveling
o at 0.66 in 1994. In short, our wage series point towards  divergence for skilled wages,
weak  convergence for unskilled wages, and no conclusive trend for the skilled-unskilled
wage ratio.
Was the moderate  convergence for unskilled wages more an inter-regional or an intra-
regional phenomenon? To address this, we decompose the total worldwide variance of the
unskilled wages into shares due to within-group and between-group variation (using the
regional groupings in Table 1 and a standard sum of squares decomposition). Initially, in
the 1970s, the between-group and the within-group components were approximately equal.
Around the early 1980s, however, the between-group variance began rising steadily, while
the within-group variance started falling. Eventually, by 1994, the between-group and
within-group shares accounted for about two-thirds and one-third respectively of the total
variance in unskilled wages. In short, convergence took place primarily within regions; as
unskilled wage levels drew closer within geographical locales, this had the eect of increasing
the variance of wages across regions.
We can pinpoint even more specically where most of the convergence took place {
among the open economies, and especially among the open non-OECD economies. For
this latter group of LDCs, the CV of unskilled wages fell substantially between 1970-1994
from 0.93 to 0.60, a more than 30% decline. For the relative wage ratio, the CV actually
rose from 0.48 in 1970 to a peak of 0.78 in 1986, but then fell by more than 50% to
close o the period at a low of 0.35. It helps to remember that many of the countries
within this category became open to international trade only in the late 1980s. Thus,
the relative wage convergence coincided with policy moves towards liberalization. Even
the CV of this wage ratio for the OECD countries, which typically had been open since
the 1960s, experienced noticeable convergence, falling from 0.35 to 0.25. Conversely, the
closed economies did not share in this relative convergence { the CV of the wage ratio
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for these 21 countries uctuated cyclically during the 25 year period, but underwent no
distinct trend. Moreover, the CV between open and closed economies more than doubled
from 0.08 to 0.22, indicating a divergence in relative wage levels between the two groups.
This uniqueness of the convergence experience to the open economies once again invites the
conclusion that HOS forces were at work in pushing relative wages towards parity among
open economies.
5 Conclusion
This paper has constructed a new standardized real wage data base for skilled and unskilled
labor the world around over the past 30 years. In Section 4, we brought this new data to
bear on various key issues in convergence and HOS theory. We found some evidence that
unskilled wages underwent modest  convergence over the last 30 years, despite the well-
publicized results on aggregate per capita income divergence in the macro literature. The
most striking result though was the uncovering of a broad-based relative convergence in
the skilled-unskilled ratio worldwide. This trend was even stronger within a \club" of 34
open economies, suggesting that HOS forces may be at work in inuencing wage premia in
a globalizing world.
There is however still a lot of scope for research. A natural next step would be to
try to quantify the sources of relative wage convergence more precisely. Movements in
relative factor prices can in general be attributed to three sources { changes in factor
endowments, changes in relative prices (which reect the eects of trade and openness),
and changes in technology (Jones and Engerman 1996). A regression approach has already
been used to decompose the sources of movements in the wage-rental ratio in the Atlantic
Economy of the First Globalization Boom (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999). To do the
same for our relative wage series, additional data on skilled and unskilled labor factor
endowments, and the relative prices of skilled labor-intensive and unskilled labor-intensive
goods would be needed. Most importantly, we would need separate measures of technology
or productivity in skilled labor-intensive and unskilled labor-intensive industries. This
decomposition exercise could potentially help to answer such questions as whether HOS
eects or skill-biased technological change have been the main cause of the rise in inequality
in the United States. Also, it could allow us to test for a link between wage catch-up and
technological catch-up to verify the Gerschenkron (1952) story explicitly.
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Table 1
Country Coverage by Geographical Regions (1968-1998)
Years of coverage are in round parentheses. The first range applies to unskilled wages, while the second range
applies to skilled wages. The 67 countries analyzed in Section 4, for which skilled and unskilled wage series could
be deduced for 1970-1994, are indicated by ***.
Sub-Saharan Africa (42)
Angola [AGO] (82-97; 82-97)
Benin [BEN] (68-91; 68-91) ***
Botswana [BWA] (75-84; 75-84)
Burkina Faso [BFA] (68-91; 68-91) ***
Burundi [BDI] (68-92; 68-92) ***
Cameroon [CMR] (68-92; 68-92) ***
Cape Verde [CPV] (76-86; 76-86)
Central African Rep. [CAF] (70-97; 70-97) ***
Chad [TCD] (70-97; 70-97) ***
Comoros [COM] (78-92; 78-92)
Congo, Dem. Rep. [ZAR] (69-78; 69-83)
Congo, Rep. [COG] (68-79; 68-79)
Cote d’Ivoire [CIV] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Djibouti [DJI] (78-87; 78-87)
Ethiopia [ETH] (68-78; 68-94)
Gabon [GAB] (68-95; 68-95) ***
Ghana [GHA] (68-93; 68-93) ***
Guinea-Bissau [GNB] (77-81; 77-81)
Kenya [KEN] (84-85; 75-85)
Lesotho [LSO] (81-90; 81-90)
Liberia [LBR] (71-86; 71-86)
Madagascar [MDG] (77-95; 77-95)
Malawi [MWI] (76-97; 68-97)
Mali [MLI] (70-90; 70-90)
Mauritius [MUS] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Mozambique [MOZ] (87-89; 87-89)
Niger [NER] (68-88; 68-88)
Nigeria [NGA] (68-95; 68-95) ***
Reunion [REU] (68-82; 68-82)
Rwanda [RWA] (76-91; 76-91)
Senegal [SEN] (68-92; 68-92) ***
Seychelles [SYC] (68-91; 68-91) ***
Sierra Leone [SLE] (68-96; 68-96) ***
Somalia [SOM] (69-79; 69-79)
South Africa [ZAF] (93-94; 93-94)
Sudan [SDN] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Swaziland [SWZ] (75-93; 75-93)
Tanzania [TZA] (68-72; 68-72)
Togo [TGO] (68-93; 68-93) ***
Uganda [UGA] (93; 93)
Zambia [ZMB] (68-96; 68-96) ***
Zimbabwe [ZWE] (80-87; 80-87)
North Africa & the Middle East (14)
Algeria [DZA] (68-92; 68-92) ***
Bahrain [BHR] (78-98; 78-98)
Cyprus [CYP] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Egypt [EGY] (94-95; 87-95)
Iran [IRN] (69-86; 69-86)
Israel [ISR] (68-81; 68-81)
Jordan [JOR] (68-95; 68-95) ***
Kuwait [KWT] (75; 75)
Morocco [MAR] (68-79; 68-79)
Qatar [QAT] (79-81; 79-81)
Syria [SYR] (68-95; 68-95) ***
Tunisia [TUN] (68-94; 68-97) ***
Turkey [TUR] (75-94; 75-94)
Yemen [YEM] (69-96; 69-96) ***
South & Central America (20)
Argentina [ARG] (68-95; 68-95) ***
Belize [BLZ] (80-95; 80-95)
Bolivia [BOL] (73-97; 73-97) ***
Brazil [BRA] (71-87; 71-87)
Chile [CHL] (69-86; 69-86)
Colombia [COL] (81-89; 81-89)
Costa Rica [CRI] (68-95; 68-95) ***
Ecuador [ECU] (76-79; 76-79)
El Salvador [SLV] (71-97; 68-97) ***
Guatemala [GTM] (68-94; 68-94) ***
Guyana [GUY] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Honduras [HND] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Mexico [MEX] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Nicaragua [NIC] (68-96; 68-96) ***
Panama [PAN] (69-79; 69-79)
Paraguay [PRY] (68-82; 68-82)
Peru [PER] (68-98; 68-98) ***
Suriname [SUR] (70-96; 68-96) ***
Uruguay [URY] (69-95; 69-95) ***
Venezuela [VEN] (68-90; 68-90) ***
North America & the Caribbean (14)
Bahamas, The [BHS] (68-91; 68-90) ***
Barbados [BRB] (68-95; 68-95) ***
Canada [CAN] (68-85; 68-85)
Dominica [DMA] (--; 71)
Dominican Rep. [DOM] (72-97; 72-97) ***
Grenada [GRD] (76-95; 76-95)
Haiti [HTI] (68-88; 68-88)
Jamaica [JAM] (68-79; 68-79)
Puerto Rico [PRI] (68-97; 68-96) ***
St. Kitts & Nevis [KNA] (79-85; 79-85)
St. Lucia [LCA] (68-91; 68-91) ***
St. Vincent [VCT] (74-98; 74-98)
Trinidad & Tobago [TTO] (68-96; 68-96) ***
United States [USA] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Pacific Basin (17)
Australia [AUS] (68-96; 68-96) ***
China [CHN] (90-97; 90-97)
Fiji [FJI] (68-88; 68-88)
Hong Kong, China [HKG] (68-98; 68-98) ***
Indonesia [IDN] (69-92; 69-92) ***
Japan [JPN] (72-96; 68-96) ***
Korea [KOR] (70-97; 76-97)
Malaysia [MYS] (68-95; 68-95) ***
New Zealand [NZL] (68-91; 68-91) ***
Papua New Guinea [PNG] (82-96; 79-96)
Philippines [PHL] (72-95; 72-95) ***
Samoa [WSM] (68-79; 68-79)
Singapore [SGP] (68-96; 68-96) ***
Solomon Islands [SLB] (86; 86)
Taiwan [TWN] (68-70; 68-70)
Thailand [THA] (76-95; 76-95)
Tonga [TON] (75-85; 75-85)
South Asia (6)
Bangladesh [BGD] (69-97; 69-97) ***
India [IND] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Myanmar [MMR] (70-98; 70-98) ***
Nepal [NPL] (75-90; 75-81)
Pakistan [PAK] (68-81; 68-83)
Sri Lanka [LKA] (77-97; 68-95)
Eastern Europe (7)
Bulgaria [BGR] (90; 90)
Czechoslovakia [CSA] (69-91; 69-91);
from 1992-1997, Czech Rep. [CZE] ***
Hungary [HUN] (70-97; 70-97) ***
Romania [ROM] (73-97; 73-97) ***
Russian Fed. [RUS] (88-95; 88-95)
Slovakia [SVK] (95-98; 95-98)
Yugoslavia [YGA] (85-92; 83-92)
Western Europe (19)
Austria [AUT] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Belgium [BEL] (68-98; 68-98) ***
Denmark [DNK] (77-92; 77-92)
Finland [FIN] (68-94; 68-95) ***
France [FRA] (75; 68-75)
Germany, Fed. Rep. [DEU] (68-98; 68-98) ***
Greece [GRC] (68-82; 68-82)
Iceland [ISL] (68-96; 68-96) ***
Ireland [IRL] (68-82; 68-84)
Italy [ITA] (68-97; 68-97) ***
Luxembourg [LYX] (95; 77-95)
Malta [MLT] (68-71; 68-85)
Netherlands [NLD] (68-90; 68-90) ***
Norway [NOR] (75-97; 68-97)
Portugal [PRT] (69-94; 69-94) ***
Spain [ESP] (68-76; 68-76)
Sweden [SWE] (68-95; 68-95) ***
Switzerland [CHE] (68-82; 68-82)
United Kingdom [GBR] (68-98; 68-98) ***
Summary:
Total No. of Countries = 139
Hypothetical Maximum Number of Skilled or
Unskilled Wage Data Points = 4309
Actual No. of Unskilled Wage Data Points
= 2707 (62.8% coverage)
Actual No. of Skilled Wage Data Points
= 2818 (65.4% coverage)
Notes: See Section 3 for details on the derivation of these wage series. From 1992, data from the Czech Republic is
linked to data from Czechoslovakia. This wage series should be strictly interpreted as pertaining only to the Czech
Republic (excluding Slovakia), assuming that labor markets within Czechoslovakia were well-integrated before its
break-up in 1992.
Table 2a
Summary Statistics of Unskilled Occupational Wages (1968-1998)
Statistics that follow refer to the raw un-interpolated real wage data. All wages are deflated by a PPP
index for consumption goods and are in 1990 US$.
Occupation Name and Code
Number in October Inquiry
No. of
Observations
5th
percentile
Median 95th
percentile
Thread and yarn spinner,
Textiles industry (#25) 1122 0.61 2.25 7.72
Sewing-machine operator,
manufacture of wearing apparel,
excluding footwear (#30)
1411 0.61 2.29 7.36
Laborer, printing, publishing
and allied industries (#51) 1338 0.44 1.93 8.95
Laborer, manufacture of
industrial chemicals and other
chemical products (#56/#59) **
1127 0.52 2.13 9.04
Laborer, manufacture of
machinery except electrical
(#70)
985 0.51 2.55 9.09
Laborer, electric light and
power (#80) 1264 0.48 2.28 10.49
Laborer, construction industry
(#90) 1574 0.40 2.08 9.58
** Prior to 1983, only one figure was reported in the October Inquiry for the wages of unskilled laborers in the
manufacture of chemicals. Occupation #56 (unskilled laborer in the manufacture of industrial chemicals) and
occupation #59 (unskilled laborer in the manufacture of other chemical products) were introduced when the scope of
the Inquiry was expanded in 1983. For consistency with the pre-1983 years, the OWW reports an average of #56 and
#59.
Table 2b
Summary Statistics of Skilled Occupational Wages (1983-1998)
Statistics that follow refer to the raw un-interpolated real wage data. All wages are deflated by a PPP
index for consumption goods and are in 1990 US$.
Occupation Name and Code
Number in October Inquiry
No. of
Observations
5th
percentile
Median 95th
percentile
Chemical engineer, manufacture
of industrial chemicals (#52) 357 1.18 7.22 22.26
Power distribution and
transmission engineer, electric
power and light (#76)
455 1.41 8.49 24.34
Bank Accountant (#129) 503 1.40 9.65 22.29
Computer programmer, insurance
industry (#133) 401 1.03 6.36 15.29
Government executive official,
public administration (#139) 378 1.08 8.64 26.87
Mathematics teacher (third level),
education services (#145) 464 1.10 9.51 23.30
General physician, medical and
dental services (#152) 539 1.17 10.19 24.57
Table 2c
Summary Statistics of Fairly Skilled Occupational Wages (1968-1998)
Occupation Name and Code
Number in October Inquiry
No. of
Observations
5th
percentile
Median 95th
percentile
Chemistry technician / Laboratory
Assistant, manufacture of industrial
chemicals (#53) **
893 1.04 4.27 12.05
Occupational Health Nurse, Iron
and Steel Basic Industries (#61) 577 1.02 4.59 13.90
Machinery Fitter-Assembler,
manufacture of machinery except
electrical (#69)
1053 0.77 3.79 10.79
Building electrician, construction
(#81) 1523 0.77 3.41 11.37
Stenographer-typist, wholesale
trade / grocery (#91) 1242 1.02 3.81 9.21
Stored records clerk, wholesale
trade / grocery (#92) 1280 0.84 3.29 8.65
Salesperson, retail trade / grocery
(#96) 1399 0.72 2.49 7.64
Bank teller, banks (#131) 1374 1.02 4.56 10.95
Book-keeping machine operator
(#132) 1205 1.00 4.33 10.80
Automobile mechanic, repair of
motor vehicles (#159) 1482 0.96 3.30 10.38
** Wages reported prior to 1983 for laboratory assistants were matched with those reported for chemistry
technicians post-1983, given the good match in job descriptions between the two occupations.
Table 3a
Summary Results from Fixed Effects Regressions of Unskilled Occupational Wages (1968-1998)
Dependent variable: occupation listed in the leftmost column
Occn.
No. #25 #30 #51 #56/#59 #70 #80 #90
#25 NA
0.87 (55.85) ***
R2 = 0.89
SEP: 0.085; 0.194
0.82 (44.06) ***
R2 = 0.86
SEP: 0.122; 0.208
0.74 (39.50) ***
R2 = 0.87
SEP: 0.125; 0.189
0.95 (53.26) ***
R2 = 0.86
SEP: 0.126; 0.159
0.52 (27.65) ***
R2 = 0.81
SEP: 0.122; 0.253
0.71 (35.91) ***
R2 = 0.83
SEP: 0.109; 0.249
#30
0.77 (55.85) ***
R2 = 0.89
SEP: 0.071; 0.128
NA
0.77 (46.06) ***
R2 = 0.86
SEP: 0.072; 0.153
0.64 (35.95) ***
R2 = 0.84
SEP: 0.083; 0.163
0.87 (53.05) ***
R2 = 0.85
SEP: 0.094; 0.139
0.43 (25.26) ***
R2 = 0.76
SEP: 0.090; 0.196
0.55 (34.26) ***
R2 = 0.82
SEP: 0.088; 0.196
#51
0.70 (44.06) ***
R2 = 0.86
SEP: 0.113; 0.138
0.69 (46.06) ***
R2 = 0.86
SEP: 0.087; 0.144
NA
0.71 (49.76) ***
R2 = 0.91
SEP: 0.096; 0.117
0.82 (45.97) ***
R2 = 0.91
SEP: 0.082; 0.135
0.55 (41.03) ***
R2 = 0.86
SEP: 0.096; 0.137
0.48 (47.21) ***
R2 = 0.85
SEP: 0.095; 0.153
#56/#59
0.73 (39.50) ***
R2 = 0.87
SEP: 0.139; 0.173
0.70 (35.95) ***
R2 = 0.84
SEP: 0.111; 0.214
0.85 (49.76) ***
R2 = 0.91
SEP: 0.094; 0.168
NA
0.91 (45.84) ***
R2 = 0.94
SEP: 0.087; 0.160
0.48 (40.84) ***
R2 = 0.88
SEP: 0.083; 0.203
0.59 (35.46) ***
R2 = 0.88
SEP: 0.085; 0.219
#70
0.74 (53.26) ***
R2 = 0.86
SEP: 0.135; 0.148
0.78 (53.05) ***
R2 = 0.85
SEP: 0.111; 0.180
0.74 (45.97) ***
R2 = 0.91
SEP: 0.082; 0.188
0.69 (45.84) ***
R2 = 0.94
SEP: 0.086; 0.167
NA
0.51 (31.87) ***
R2 = 0.88
SEP: 0.087; 0.241
0.57 (37.46) ***
R2 = 0.88
SEP: 0.099; 0.236
#80
0.71 (27.65) ***
R2 = 0.81
SEP: 0.147; 0.224
0.65 (25.26) ***
R2 = 0.76
SEP: 0.135; 0.246
0.88 (41.03) ***
R2 = 0.86
SEP: 0.113; 0.177
0.80 (30.84) ***
R2 = 0.88
SEP: 0.099; 0.206
0.89 (31.87) ***
R2 = 0.88
SEP: 0.105; 0.222
NA
0.48 (23.70) ***
R2 = 0.79
SEP: 0.117; 0.252
#90
0.64 (35.91) ***
R2 = 0.83
SEP: 0.131; 0.148
0.69 (34.62) ***
R2 = 0.82
SEP: 0.131; 0.185
1.08 (47.21) ***
R2 = 0.85
SEP: 0.116; 0.194
0.53 (35.46) ***
R2 = 0.88
SEP: 0.095; 0.164
0.88 (37.46) ***
R2 = 0.88
SEP: 0.114; 0.177
0.48 (23.70) ***
R2 = 0.79
SEP: 0.106; 0.207
NA
Notes: The first line in each cell is the slope coefficient estimate, followed by absolute t-statistics in parentheses; \ *** indicates slope coefficient is significantly
different from 0 at the 1% level. The second row reports the overall R2 of the fixed effects regressions. The third row in each cell indicates the average standard
error of the predictors (SEP), the first figure being for the predictor of out-of-sample country fixed effects, and the second figure referring to the fixed effects
linear wage predictor. For more details, please see Section 3.3.
Table 3b
Summary Results from Fixed Effects Regressions of Skilled Occupational Wages (1983-1998)
Dependent variable: occupation listed in the leftmost column
Occn.
No. #52 #76 #129 #133 #139 #145 #152
#52 NA
0.17 (2.48) **
R2 = 0.62
SEP: 0.740; 1.543
0.120 (1.73) *
R2 = 0.33
SEP: 0.933; 1.484
0.79 (6.67) ***
R2 = 0.57
SEP: 0.794; 1.284
0.28 (6.17) ***
R2 = 0.52
SEP: 0.968; 1.030
0.24 (3.30) ***
R2 = 0.52
SEP: 0.871; 1.591
0.04 (0.52)
R2 = 0.56
SEP: 0.843; 1.519
#76
0.13 (2.48) **
R2 = 0.62
SEP: 0.669; 1.121
NA
0.25 (4.93) ***
R2 = 0.60
SEP: 0.643; 1.119
0.40 (4.61) ***
R2 = 0.61
SEP: 0.824; 1.070
0.53 (10.22) ***
R2 = 0.46
SEP: 0.965; 0.898
0.35 (10.31) ***
R2 = 0.67
SEP: 0.632; 0.893
0.44 (9.67) ***
R2 = 0.70
SEP: 0.688; 1.027
#129
0.08 (1.73) *
R2 = 0.33
SEP: 0.789; 0.925
0.22 (4.92) ***
R2 = 0.60
SEP: 0.569; 0.980
NA
0.39 (5.57) ***
R2 = 0.54
SEP: 0.632; 0.801
0.11 (2.01) **
R2 = 0.34
SEP: 0.868; 1.220
0.26 (5.56) ***
R2 = 0.43
SEP: 0.701; 1.086
0.32 (6.16) ***
R2 = 0.62
SEP: 0.558; 0.989
#133
0.17 (6.67) ***
R2 = 0.57
SEP: 0.500; 0.532
0.14 (4.61) ***
R2 = 0.61
SEP: 0.539; 0.695
0.19 (5.57) ***
R2 = 0.54
SEP: 0.504; 0.650
NA
0.14 (5.46) ***
R2 = 0.64
SEP: 0.502; 0.658
0.24 (10.19) ***
R2 = 0.60
SEP: 0.640; 0.547
0.18 (6.93) ***
R2 = 0.66
SEP: 0.517; 0.644
#139
0.60 (6.17) ***
R2 = 0.52
SEP: 1.256; 1.466
0.49 (10.22) ***
R2 = 0.46
SEP: 1.129; 1.057
0.13 (2.01) **
R2 = 0.34
SEP: 1.278; 1.587
0.80 (5.46) ***
R2 = 0.64
SEP: 1.229; 1.673
NA
0.46 (7.69) ***
R2 = 0.41
SEP: 1.038; 1.252
0.47 (8.12) ***
R2 = 0.59
SEP: 0.922; 1.170
#145
0.16 (3.30) ***
R2 = 0.52
SEP: 0.839; 1.040
0.58 (10.31) ***
R2 = 0.67
SEP: 0.545; 1.118
0.28 (5.56) ***
R2 = 0.43
SEP: 0.741; 1.125
0.95 (10.19) ***
R2 = 0.60
SEP: 0.824; 1.011
0.32 (7.69) ***
R2 = 0.41
SEP: 0.859; 0.849
NA
0.69 (11.24) ***
R2 = 0.58
SEP: 0.666; 1.132
#152
0.02 (0.52)
R2 = 0.56
SEP: 0.856; 0.826
0.40 (9.67) ***
R2 = 0.70
SEP: 0.621; 0.864
0.24 (6.16) ***
R2 = 0.62
SEP: 0.670; 0.810
0.61 (6.93) ***
R2 = 0.66
SEP: 0.860; 0.984
0.35 (8.12) ***
R2 = 0.59
SEP: 0.838; 0.804
0.31 (11.24) ***
R2 = 0.58
SEP: 0.665; 0.705
NA
Notes:
See notes for table 3a. *, **, and *** respectively indicate that the slope coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 3c
Regression Results from Proxying for the Skilled Wage Series
Dependent variable: Skilled wage series 1983-1998
Instrument
Occn. No.
Slope
Coefficient
Overall
R2
Root Mean
Square Error
Standard Error of
linear predictor
(fixed effects
regression)
Standard Error of
predictor for out-
of-sample country
fixed effects
#53 0.20
(8.35) ***
0.78 0.306 0.450 0.354
#61 0.24
(13.62) ***
0.75 0.373 0.598 0.414
#69 0.49
(10.70) ***
0.73 0.671 0.561 0.513
#81 0.35
(10.56) ***
0.59 0.647 0.535 0.445
#91 0.44
(8.64) ***
0.78 0.619 0.506 0.473
#92 0.43
(10.02) ***
0.68 0.587 0.552 0.439
#96 0.46
(12.83) ***
0.64 0.598 0.480 0.423
#131 0.36
(10.78) ***
0.79 0.585 0.401 0.424
#132 0.23
(6.78) ***
0.77 0.733 0.381 0.494
#159 0.28
(7.85) ***
0.75 0.863 0.453 0.505
Notes: Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. *** indicates slope coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the
1% level. For details, please see Section 3.4.
Table 4
Regression Results on Unconditional Beta Convergence (67 countries)
Dependent variable: Growth rate of designated variable (in % per annum)
(1)
Real GDP per
worker
(2)
Real Skilled
Wages
(3)
Real Unskilled
Wages
(4a)
Relative Skilled-
Unskilled Wage
(4b)
Relative Skilled-
Unskilled Wage
Initial Level 0.0000249
(0.723)
0.0557 *
(1.960)
-0.149
(1.527)
-0.197 ***
(2.831)
-0.350 ***
(3.637)
Constant 0.782 **
(2.181)
-0.846 ***
(2.835)
0.455
(1.219)
0.488
(1.358)
1.044 **
(2.433)
Adjusted R2 -0.0075 0.0413 0.0198 0.0961 0.160
Root Mean
Square Error
1.840 1.193 2.032 1.604 1.559
Convergence
“Half-Life”
Divergence Divergence 63 years
Gap: 7.41 US$
42 years
Gap: 8.47 US$
33 years
Gap: 5.92 US$
Notes: Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The number of
observations is 67, except for (4b) where two outliers (BDI and NGA) are removed. The convergence “half-life” is the number of years required to
halve the gap (reported in the ``Gap’’ row) between the 5th and 95th percentile of the 1994 distribution of the relevant income or wage variable.
See Section 4.2 for details.
Table 5
Regression Results on Unconditional Beta Convergence (34 Open Economies)
Dependent variable: Growth Rate of Designated Variable (in % per annum)
(1)
Real GDP per worker
(2)
Real Skilled Wages
(3)
Real Unskilled
Wages
(4)
Relative Skilled-
Unskilled Wage
Initial Level -0.0000451
(1.069)
0.0319
(1.128)
-0.300 ***
(2.961)
-0.448 ***
(4.131)
Constant 2.140 ***
(3.894)
-0.351
(1.024)
1.843 ***
(3.840)
1.072 **
(2.154)
Adjusted R2 0.0043 0.0082 0.191 0.328
Root Mean Square
Error
1.775 0.829 1.777 1.363
Convergence “Half-
Life”
53 years
Gap: 29245 US$
Divergence 29 years
Gap: 7.91 US$
33 years
Gap: 4.65 US$
Notes: See Table 4. Countries are classified as open or closed according to the Sachs and Warner (1995) criterion.
Table 6
Comparison of Wage and Aggregate Income Growth Rates for Open versus Closed Economies
(% per annum)
Annual Growth Rate of: Open Open
(OECD only)
Open
(non-OECD only)
Closed
Skilled Real Wages 70-82:
83-94:
70-94:
-0.15
+0.08
+0.00
+0.29
+0.09
+0.19
-0.43
+0.08
-0.12
-0.87
-0.47
-0.71
Unskilled Real Wages 70-82:
83-94:
70-94:
+0.72
+0.64
+0.74
+1.14
+0.64
+0.92
+0.46
+0.64
+0.64
-0.41
-1.39
-0.86
Skilled/Unskilled Wage 70-82:
83-94:
70-94:
-0.87
-0.56
-0.74
-0.85
-0.55
-0.73
-0.88
-0.57
-0.76
-0.46
+0.93
+0.15
Real GDP per Worker 70-82:
83-94:
70-94:
+1.95
+1.54
+1.65
+1.71
+1.82
+1.74
+2.09
+1.36
+1.59
+1.45
-0.86
+0.20
Figure 1
The Worldwide Distribution of Hourly Real Wages, 1994
a: Skilled Wages (1990 US$)
b: Unskilled Wages (1990 US$)
Figure 2
Unconditional Beta Convergence (Sample of 67 countries)
a: Unskilled Real Wage, 1990 US$
b: Skilled-Unskilled Wage Ratio
Figure 3
Unconditional Beta Convergence (Convergence Club of 34 Open Economies)
a: Unskilled Real Wage, 1990 US$
b: Skilled-Unskilled Wage Ratio
